Wednesday, July 18, 2012

WHY THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ CANNOT BE APPEALED BY CROSS RIVER STATE OR NIGERIA


Since the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on the 9th July, 2012 the internet especially the face book has been awashed with speculation that the Judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered in October, 2002 in the case filed by Cameroon against Nigeria is appealable within ten years of its delivery.

Some of the commentators were even demanding that the Cross River State filed an appeal against the judgment of the International Court of Justice which Nigeria had since accepted and had given gone further to cede the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula which is the subject matter of the case filed by Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

The House of Representatives on the 18th July, 2012 in a plenary session curiously joined the debate by passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government of Nigeria to apply for a review of the Judgment of the ICJ before the 10th October, 2012 when the judgment of the ICJ shall be ten years old. The House of Representatives relied on the provisions of 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which the ICJ relied on was at variance with the provisions of Article 6 of the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1884.

It is well settled that the on the 12th June, 2006 an agreement otherwise known as the “Green Tree Agreement (GTA) between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula was signed. The Agreement was signed on behalf of Cameroon by President Paul Biya of Cameroon and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the United Nations; the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States of America; the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria recognises the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. By virtue of Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria unequivocally recognise the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the International Court of Justice and commit herself to the process of the implementation of the Judgment which both countries had agreed.

It is instructive that the Green Tree Agreement is yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. Section 12 subsection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered and amended) provides thus” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. Undoubtedly the Green Tree Agreement to the extent that it was never presented before the National Assembly for ratification is unconstitutional.

Subsequently in a ceremony on the 21st August  2006 in the Calabar Sport Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State attended by dignitaries across the world the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally handed over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. This included the formal withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from the Bakassi Peninsula.

It is therefore preposterous that after nearly ten years after the Judgment of the ICJ was delivered and six years after the sovereignty of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was handed over some commentators would be advocating for an appeal to be filed by the Cross River State against the Judgment of the ICJ.

The pertinent question is Judgments of the ICJ appealable? In other words can judgment of the ICJ subject to an appeal?  The answer to the question is in the negative.

There basically six documents that guide the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These are United Nations Charter; the Statutes of the Court; Practice Directions and Rules of the Court and other texts.

It is submitted that Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides thus:

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party”.

It follows that there is no appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ. It goes without saying that either Nigeria or the Cross River State can appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002 in the in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is settled.

A cursorily reading of Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ starkly reveals that ICJ is only vested with the jurisdiction to review its judgment in the event of a dispute as to its scope or meaning at the request of any of the Parties. The question is: Is there any dispute as to the scope or meaning of the Judgment in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria delivered on the 10th October, 2002 to warrant any of the Parties to invite the ICJ to review the said Judgment? The answer is Capital NO. There is no dispute whatever between Cameroon and Nigeria as to the scope and meaning of the Judgment. The Judgment has been unequivocally accepted by Nigeria by her signing of the Green Tree Agreement on the 12th June, 2002 in New York, the United States of America. Nigeria cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate. The equitable doctrine of estoppel shall operate against Nigeria in the event she makes any attempt to repudiate the Green Tree Agreement signed nearly six years ago. Generally when an estoppel binds a party to litigation, he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. Therefore from the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates an estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary.

Assuming without conceding that Nigeria did not sign the Green Tree Agreement; can she apply to the ICJ for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002? 

Article 61 of the Statute of ICJ provides that an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

I did not think that there is new fact discovered by Nigeria of such a decisive nature which was not known to Nigeria and the Court at the time of the delivery of the Judgment in October, 2002. In the event there is discovery of such a decisive fact it must be shown that it was not due negligence of the Party applying for a revision.



The General Provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which the House of Representatives in its resolution had relied on to demand that the Federal Government initiate a process for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ was readily available at the time the judgment of the ICJ was delivered but was never commended to the Court by the Nigerian Legal Team. This in itself constitutes negligence which is not one of the factors that could avail a Party requesting a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ under Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. 

It is pertinent to reproduce Article 61, sub paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Statute of the ICJ for the purpose of clarity and understanding for the procedure for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ thus:

“Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment”.

From the above, it is clear that it is the procedure for the revision of the Judgment of the ICJ as laid down by Article 61 of the Statutes of the ICJ which some commentators are confusing with appeal of the Judgment of the Judgment of the ICJ within ten years from the date of the Judgment.

It is pertinent to state that the ten years within which Nigeria may apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming the circumstance enumerated by the Statute of the ICJ) is applicable shall lapse on the 10th October, 2012.

It is clear as the crystal that Article 61 of the Statutes shall not avail Nigeria in the event she makes an application to the ICJ for the revision of the Nigeria delivered by the ICJ on the 10th October, 2002 in favour of Cameroon in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is certain that no Lawyer worth his salt will ever proffer such advice to Nigeria to gamble by making such a frivolous application to the ICJ.

Another question that is worthy of tackling is: whether the Cross River State can apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming without conceding that Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ applies). The answer to the question is a Capital No.

The Cross River State was never a Party in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria filed by Cameroon before the ICJ. The Parties to the case were Cameroon and Nigeria. It is well settled that the Cross River State is one of the 36 States that is composed of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It follows that the Cross River State cannot apply for the revocation of Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Cross River State is not recognised as a State Party by the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34 subparagraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Cross River State is not a State within the concept of International Law. This proposition was given judicial approval by the High Court of the United Kingdom in the case DIEPREYE SOLOMON PETER ALAMIEYESEIGHA Vs. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE [2005] EWHC . This was an application for Judicial Review filed by the former Governor of Bayelsa State, challenging the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute him for money laundering. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha brought an application that the decision to prosecute should be quashed on the grounds that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his capacity as Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa State, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The question that was resolved was whether a Governor and Chief Executive of a state, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is entitled to immunity in criminal proceedings brought in this country.

The Court resolved the question in the negative and held that  and held that since the Nigerian Constitution shows that the States such as Bayelsa State do not have any powers in respect of a number of matters which would normally be associated with a sovereign state such as, "arms. ammunitions and explosives", banking, "citizenship ,naturalisation and aliens", "defence", "immigration into and emigration from Nigeria", maritime matters, mines and minerals including oil fields and natural gas policing, post telegraph and telephone services, prisons, railways, "taxation of income, profits and capital gains except as otherwise prescribed by the [Nigerian] Constitution". These are all federal matters which are dealt with by the Federal Government to the exclusion of the Federal States (Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution paragraphs items 2, 6,9,17,30,36,39, 45,46,48,55 and 59).

It is therefore clear that the claim by some people that the Judgment of the ICJ can be appealed against within 10 years by the Cross River State is hollow and not well founded.

OKOI OBONO-OBLA



WHY THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ CANNOT BE APPEALED BY CROSS RIVER STATE OR NIGERIA

Since the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on the 9th July, 2012 the internet especially the face book has been awashed with speculation that the Judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered in October, 2002 in the case filed by Cameroon against Nigeria is appealable within ten years of its delivery.

Some of the commentators were even demanding that the Cross River State filed an appeal against the judgment of the International Court of Justice which Nigeria had since accepted and had given gone further to cede the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula which is the subject matter of the case filed by Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

The House of Representatives on the 18th July, 2012 in a plenary session curiously joined the debate by passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government of Nigeria to apply for a review of the Judgment of the ICJ before the 10th October, 2012 when the judgment of the ICJ shall be ten years old. The House of Representatives relied on the provisions of 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which the ICJ relied on was at variance with the provisions of Article 6 of the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1884.

It is well settled that the on the 12th June, 2006 an agreement otherwise known as the “Green Tree Agreement (GTA) between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula was signed. The Agreement was signed on behalf of Cameroon by President Paul Biya of Cameroon and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the United Nations; the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States of America; the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria recognises the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. By virtue of Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria unequivocally recognise the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the International Court of Justice and commit herself to the process of the implementation of the Judgment which both countries had agreed.

It is instructive that the Green Tree Agreement is yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. Section 12 subsection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered and amended) provides thus” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. Undoubtedly the Green Tree Agreement to the extent that it was never presented before the National Assembly for ratification is unconstitutional.

Subsequently in a ceremony on the 21st August  2006 in the Calabar Sport Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State attended by dignitaries across the world the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally handed over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. This included the formal withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from the Bakassi Peninsula.

It is therefore preposterous that after nearly ten years after the Judgment of the ICJ was delivered and six years after the sovereignty of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was handed over some commentators would be advocating for an appeal to be filed by the Cross River State against the Judgment of the ICJ.

The pertinent question is Judgments of the ICJ appealable? In other words can judgment of the ICJ subject to an appeal?  The answer to the question is in the negative.

There basically six documents that guide the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These are United Nations Charter; the Statutes of the Court; Practice Directions and Rules of the Court and other texts.

It is submitted that Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides thus:

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party”.

It follows that there is no appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ. It goes without saying that either Nigeria or the Cross River State can appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002 in the in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is settled.

A cursorily reading of Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ starkly reveals that ICJ is only vested with the jurisdiction to review its judgment in the event of a dispute as to its scope or meaning at the request of any of the Parties. The question is: Is there any dispute as to the scope or meaning of the Judgment in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria delivered on the 10th October, 2002 to warrant any of the Parties to invite the ICJ to review the said Judgment? The answer is Capital NO. There is no dispute whatever between Cameroon and Nigeria as to the scope and meaning of the Judgment. The Judgment has been unequivocally accepted by Nigeria by her signing of the Green Tree Agreement on the 12th June, 2002 in New York, the United States of America. Nigeria cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate. The equitable doctrine of estoppel shall operate against Nigeria in the event she makes any attempt to repudiate the Green Tree Agreement signed nearly six years ago. Generally when an estoppel binds a party to litigation, he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. Therefore from the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates an estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary.

Assuming without conceding that Nigeria did not sign the Green Tree Agreement; can she apply to the ICJ for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002? 

Article 61 of the Statute of ICJ provides that an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

I did not think that there is new fact discovered by Nigeria of such a decisive nature which was not known to Nigeria and the Court at the time of the delivery of the Judgment in October, 2002. In the event there is discovery of such a decisive fact it must be shown that it was not due negligence of the Party applying for a revision.



The General Provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which the House of Representatives in its resolution had relied on to demand that the Federal Government initiate a process for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ was readily available at the time the judgment of the ICJ was delivered but was never commended to the Court by the Nigerian Legal Team. This in itself constitutes negligence which is not one of the factors that could avail a Party requesting a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ under Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. 

It is pertinent to reproduce Article 61, sub paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Statute of the ICJ for the purpose of clarity and understanding for the procedure for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ thus:

“Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment”.

From the above, it is clear that it is the procedure for the revision of the Judgment of the ICJ as laid down by Article 61 of the Statutes of the ICJ which some commentators are confusing with appeal of the Judgment of the Judgment of the ICJ within ten years from the date of the Judgment.

It is pertinent to state that the ten years within which Nigeria may apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming the circumstance enumerated by the Statute of the ICJ) is applicable shall lapse on the 10th October, 2012.

It is clear as the crystal that Article 61 of the Statutes shall not avail Nigeria in the event she makes an application to the ICJ for the revision of the Nigeria delivered by the ICJ on the 10th October, 2002 in favour of Cameroon in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is certain that no Lawyer worth his salt will ever proffer such advice to Nigeria to gamble by making such a frivolous application to the ICJ.

Another question that is worthy of tackling is: whether the Cross River State can apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming without conceding that Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ applies). The answer to the question is a Capital No.

The Cross River State was never a Party in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria filed by Cameroon before the ICJ. The Parties to the case were Cameroon and Nigeria. It is well settled that the Cross River State is one of the 36 States that is composed of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It follows that the Cross River State cannot apply for the revocation of Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Cross River State is not recognised as a State Party by the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34 subparagraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Cross River State is not a State within the concept of International Law. This proposition was given judicial approval by the High Court of the United Kingdom in the case DIEPREYE SOLOMON PETER ALAMIEYESEIGHA Vs. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE [2005] EWHC . This was an application for Judicial Review filed by the former Governor of Bayelsa State, challenging the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute him for money laundering. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha brought an application that the decision to prosecute should be quashed on the grounds that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his capacity as Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa State, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The question that was resolved was whether a Governor and Chief Executive of a state, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is entitled to immunity in criminal proceedings brought in this country.

The Court resolved the question in the negative and held that  and held that since the Nigerian Constitution shows that the States such as Bayelsa State do not have any powers in respect of a number of matters which would normally be associated with a sovereign state such as, "arms. ammunitions and explosives", banking, "citizenship ,naturalisation and aliens", "defence", "immigration into and emigration from Nigeria", maritime matters, mines and minerals including oil fields and natural gas policing, post telegraph and telephone services, prisons, railways, "taxation of income, profits and capital gains except as otherwise prescribed by the [Nigerian] Constitution". These are all federal matters which are dealt with by the Federal Government to the exclusion of the Federal States (Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution paragraphs items 2, 6,9,17,30,36,39, 45,46,48,55 and 59).

It is therefore clear that the claim by some people that the Judgment of the ICJ can be appealed against within 10 years by the Cross River State is hollow and not well founded.

OKOI OBONO-OBLA



WHY THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ CANNOT BE APPEALED BY CROSS RIVER STATE OR NIGERIA

Since the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on the 9th July, 2012 the internet especially the face book has been awashed with speculation that the Judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered in October, 2002 in the case filed by Cameroon against Nigeria is appealable within ten years of its delivery.

Some of the commentators were even demanding that the Cross River State filed an appeal against the judgment of the International Court of Justice which Nigeria had since accepted and had given gone further to cede the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula which is the subject matter of the case filed by Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

The House of Representatives on the 18th July, 2012 in a plenary session curiously joined the debate by passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government of Nigeria to apply for a review of the Judgment of the ICJ before the 10th October, 2012 when the judgment of the ICJ shall be ten years old. The House of Representatives relied on the provisions of 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which the ICJ relied on was at variance with the provisions of Article 6 of the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1884.

It is well settled that the on the 12th June, 2006 an agreement otherwise known as the “Green Tree Agreement (GTA) between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula was signed. The Agreement was signed on behalf of Cameroon by President Paul Biya of Cameroon and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the United Nations; the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States of America; the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria recognises the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. By virtue of Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria unequivocally recognise the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the International Court of Justice and commit herself to the process of the implementation of the Judgment which both countries had agreed.

It is instructive that the Green Tree Agreement is yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. Section 12 subsection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered and amended) provides thus” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. Undoubtedly the Green Tree Agreement to the extent that it was never presented before the National Assembly for ratification is unconstitutional.

Subsequently in a ceremony on the 21st August  2006 in the Calabar Sport Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State attended by dignitaries across the world the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally handed over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. This included the formal withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from the Bakassi Peninsula.

It is therefore preposterous that after nearly ten years after the Judgment of the ICJ was delivered and six years after the sovereignty of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was handed over some commentators would be advocating for an appeal to be filed by the Cross River State against the Judgment of the ICJ.

The pertinent question is Judgments of the ICJ appealable? In other words can judgment of the ICJ subject to an appeal?  The answer to the question is in the negative.

There basically six documents that guide the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These are United Nations Charter; the Statutes of the Court; Practice Directions and Rules of the Court and other texts.

It is submitted that Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides thus:

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party”.

It follows that there is no appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ. It goes without saying that either Nigeria or the Cross River State can appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002 in the in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is settled.

A cursorily reading of Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ starkly reveals that ICJ is only vested with the jurisdiction to review its judgment in the event of a dispute as to its scope or meaning at the request of any of the Parties. The question is: Is there any dispute as to the scope or meaning of the Judgment in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria delivered on the 10th October, 2002 to warrant any of the Parties to invite the ICJ to review the said Judgment? The answer is Capital NO. There is no dispute whatever between Cameroon and Nigeria as to the scope and meaning of the Judgment. The Judgment has been unequivocally accepted by Nigeria by her signing of the Green Tree Agreement on the 12th June, 2002 in New York, the United States of America. Nigeria cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate. The equitable doctrine of estoppel shall operate against Nigeria in the event she makes any attempt to repudiate the Green Tree Agreement signed nearly six years ago. Generally when an estoppel binds a party to litigation, he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. Therefore from the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates an estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary.

Assuming without conceding that Nigeria did not sign the Green Tree Agreement; can she apply to the ICJ for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002? 

Article 61 of the Statute of ICJ provides that an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

I did not think that there is new fact discovered by Nigeria of such a decisive nature which was not known to Nigeria and the Court at the time of the delivery of the Judgment in October, 2002. In the event there is discovery of such a decisive fact it must be shown that it was not due negligence of the Party applying for a revision.



The General Provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which the House of Representatives in its resolution had relied on to demand that the Federal Government initiate a process for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ was readily available at the time the judgment of the ICJ was delivered but was never commended to the Court by the Nigerian Legal Team. This in itself constitutes negligence which is not one of the factors that could avail a Party requesting a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ under Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. 

It is pertinent to reproduce Article 61, sub paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Statute of the ICJ for the purpose of clarity and understanding for the procedure for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ thus:

“Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment”.

From the above, it is clear that it is the procedure for the revision of the Judgment of the ICJ as laid down by Article 61 of the Statutes of the ICJ which some commentators are confusing with appeal of the Judgment of the Judgment of the ICJ within ten years from the date of the Judgment.

It is pertinent to state that the ten years within which Nigeria may apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming the circumstance enumerated by the Statute of the ICJ) is applicable shall lapse on the 10th October, 2012.

It is clear as the crystal that Article 61 of the Statutes shall not avail Nigeria in the event she makes an application to the ICJ for the revision of the Nigeria delivered by the ICJ on the 10th October, 2002 in favour of Cameroon in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is certain that no Lawyer worth his salt will ever proffer such advice to Nigeria to gamble by making such a frivolous application to the ICJ.

Another question that is worthy of tackling is: whether the Cross River State can apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming without conceding that Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ applies). The answer to the question is a Capital No.

The Cross River State was never a Party in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria filed by Cameroon before the ICJ. The Parties to the case were Cameroon and Nigeria. It is well settled that the Cross River State is one of the 36 States that is composed of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It follows that the Cross River State cannot apply for the revocation of Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Cross River State is not recognised as a State Party by the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34 subparagraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Cross River State is not a State within the concept of International Law. This proposition was given judicial approval by the High Court of the United Kingdom in the case DIEPREYE SOLOMON PETER ALAMIEYESEIGHA Vs. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE [2005] EWHC . This was an application for Judicial Review filed by the former Governor of Bayelsa State, challenging the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute him for money laundering. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha brought an application that the decision to prosecute should be quashed on the grounds that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his capacity as Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa State, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The question that was resolved was whether a Governor and Chief Executive of a state, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is entitled to immunity in criminal proceedings brought in this country.

The Court resolved the question in the negative and held that  and held that since the Nigerian Constitution shows that the States such as Bayelsa State do not have any powers in respect of a number of matters which would normally be associated with a sovereign state such as, "arms. ammunitions and explosives", banking, "citizenship ,naturalisation and aliens", "defence", "immigration into and emigration from Nigeria", maritime matters, mines and minerals including oil fields and natural gas policing, post telegraph and telephone services, prisons, railways, "taxation of income, profits and capital gains except as otherwise prescribed by the [Nigerian] Constitution". These are all federal matters which are dealt with by the Federal Government to the exclusion of the Federal States (Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution paragraphs items 2, 6,9,17,30,36,39, 45,46,48,55 and 59).

It is therefore clear that the claim by some people that the Judgment of the ICJ can be appealed against within 10 years by the Cross River State is hollow and not well founded.

OKOI OBONO-OBLA



WHY THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ CANNOT BE APPEALED BY CROSS RIVER STATE OR NIGERIA

Since the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on the 9th July, 2012 the internet especially the face book has been awashed with speculation that the Judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered in October, 2002 in the case filed by Cameroon against Nigeria is appealable within ten years of its delivery.

Some of the commentators were even demanding that the Cross River State filed an appeal against the judgment of the International Court of Justice which Nigeria had since accepted and had given gone further to cede the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula which is the subject matter of the case filed by Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

The House of Representatives on the 18th July, 2012 in a plenary session curiously joined the debate by passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government of Nigeria to apply for a review of the Judgment of the ICJ before the 10th October, 2012 when the judgment of the ICJ shall be ten years old. The House of Representatives relied on the provisions of 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which the ICJ relied on was at variance with the provisions of Article 6 of the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1884.

It is well settled that the on the 12th June, 2006 an agreement otherwise known as the “Green Tree Agreement (GTA) between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula was signed. The Agreement was signed on behalf of Cameroon by President Paul Biya of Cameroon and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the United Nations; the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States of America; the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria recognises the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. By virtue of Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria unequivocally recognise the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the International Court of Justice and commit herself to the process of the implementation of the Judgment which both countries had agreed.

It is instructive that the Green Tree Agreement is yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. Section 12 subsection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered and amended) provides thus” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. Undoubtedly the Green Tree Agreement to the extent that it was never presented before the National Assembly for ratification is unconstitutional.

Subsequently in a ceremony on the 21st August  2006 in the Calabar Sport Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State attended by dignitaries across the world the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally handed over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. This included the formal withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from the Bakassi Peninsula.

It is therefore preposterous that after nearly ten years after the Judgment of the ICJ was delivered and six years after the sovereignty of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was handed over some commentators would be advocating for an appeal to be filed by the Cross River State against the Judgment of the ICJ.

The pertinent question is Judgments of the ICJ appealable? In other words can judgment of the ICJ subject to an appeal?  The answer to the question is in the negative.

There basically six documents that guide the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These are United Nations Charter; the Statutes of the Court; Practice Directions and Rules of the Court and other texts.

It is submitted that Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides thus:

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party”.

It follows that there is no appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ. It goes without saying that either Nigeria or the Cross River State can appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002 in the in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is settled.

A cursorily reading of Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ starkly reveals that ICJ is only vested with the jurisdiction to review its judgment in the event of a dispute as to its scope or meaning at the request of any of the Parties. The question is: Is there any dispute as to the scope or meaning of the Judgment in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria delivered on the 10th October, 2002 to warrant any of the Parties to invite the ICJ to review the said Judgment? The answer is Capital NO. There is no dispute whatever between Cameroon and Nigeria as to the scope and meaning of the Judgment. The Judgment has been unequivocally accepted by Nigeria by her signing of the Green Tree Agreement on the 12th June, 2002 in New York, the United States of America. Nigeria cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate. The equitable doctrine of estoppel shall operate against Nigeria in the event she makes any attempt to repudiate the Green Tree Agreement signed nearly six years ago. Generally when an estoppel binds a party to litigation, he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. Therefore from the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates an estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary.

Assuming without conceding that Nigeria did not sign the Green Tree Agreement; can she apply to the ICJ for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002? 

Article 61 of the Statute of ICJ provides that an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

I did not think that there is new fact discovered by Nigeria of such a decisive nature which was not known to Nigeria and the Court at the time of the delivery of the Judgment in October, 2002. In the event there is discovery of such a decisive fact it must be shown that it was not due negligence of the Party applying for a revision.



The General Provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which the House of Representatives in its resolution had relied on to demand that the Federal Government initiate a process for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ was readily available at the time the judgment of the ICJ was delivered but was never commended to the Court by the Nigerian Legal Team. This in itself constitutes negligence which is not one of the factors that could avail a Party requesting a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ under Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. 

It is pertinent to reproduce Article 61, sub paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Statute of the ICJ for the purpose of clarity and understanding for the procedure for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ thus:

“Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment”.

From the above, it is clear that it is the procedure for the revision of the Judgment of the ICJ as laid down by Article 61 of the Statutes of the ICJ which some commentators are confusing with appeal of the Judgment of the Judgment of the ICJ within ten years from the date of the Judgment.

It is pertinent to state that the ten years within which Nigeria may apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming the circumstance enumerated by the Statute of the ICJ) is applicable shall lapse on the 10th October, 2012.

It is clear as the crystal that Article 61 of the Statutes shall not avail Nigeria in the event she makes an application to the ICJ for the revision of the Nigeria delivered by the ICJ on the 10th October, 2002 in favour of Cameroon in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is certain that no Lawyer worth his salt will ever proffer such advice to Nigeria to gamble by making such a frivolous application to the ICJ.

Another question that is worthy of tackling is: whether the Cross River State can apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming without conceding that Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ applies). The answer to the question is a Capital No.

The Cross River State was never a Party in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria filed by Cameroon before the ICJ. The Parties to the case were Cameroon and Nigeria. It is well settled that the Cross River State is one of the 36 States that is composed of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It follows that the Cross River State cannot apply for the revocation of Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Cross River State is not recognised as a State Party by the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34 subparagraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Cross River State is not a State within the concept of International Law. This proposition was given judicial approval by the High Court of the United Kingdom in the case DIEPREYE SOLOMON PETER ALAMIEYESEIGHA Vs. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE [2005] EWHC . This was an application for Judicial Review filed by the former Governor of Bayelsa State, challenging the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute him for money laundering. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha brought an application that the decision to prosecute should be quashed on the grounds that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his capacity as Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa State, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The question that was resolved was whether a Governor and Chief Executive of a state, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is entitled to immunity in criminal proceedings brought in this country.

The Court resolved the question in the negative and held that  and held that since the Nigerian Constitution shows that the States such as Bayelsa State do not have any powers in respect of a number of matters which would normally be associated with a sovereign state such as, "arms. ammunitions and explosives", banking, "citizenship ,naturalisation and aliens", "defence", "immigration into and emigration from Nigeria", maritime matters, mines and minerals including oil fields and natural gas policing, post telegraph and telephone services, prisons, railways, "taxation of income, profits and capital gains except as otherwise prescribed by the [Nigerian] Constitution". These are all federal matters which are dealt with by the Federal Government to the exclusion of the Federal States (Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution paragraphs items 2, 6,9,17,30,36,39, 45,46,48,55 and 59).

It is therefore clear that the claim by some people that the Judgment of the ICJ can be appealed against within 10 years by the Cross River State is hollow and not well founded.

OKOI OBONO-OBLA



WHY THE JUDGMENT OF THE ICJ CANNOT BE APPEALED BY CROSS RIVER STATE OR NIGERIA

Since the Judgment of the Supreme Court delivered on the 9th July, 2012 the internet especially the face book has been awashed with speculation that the Judgment of the International Court of Justice delivered in October, 2002 in the case filed by Cameroon against Nigeria is appealable within ten years of its delivery.

Some of the commentators were even demanding that the Cross River State filed an appeal against the judgment of the International Court of Justice which Nigeria had since accepted and had given gone further to cede the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula which is the subject matter of the case filed by Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon.

The House of Representatives on the 18th July, 2012 in a plenary session curiously joined the debate by passing a resolution requesting the Federal Government of Nigeria to apply for a review of the Judgment of the ICJ before the 10th October, 2012 when the judgment of the ICJ shall be ten years old. The House of Representatives relied on the provisions of 1913 Anglo-German Treaty which the ICJ relied on was at variance with the provisions of Article 6 of the General Act of Berlin Conference of 1884.

It is well settled that the on the 12th June, 2006 an agreement otherwise known as the “Green Tree Agreement (GTA) between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of the Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula was signed. The Agreement was signed on behalf of Cameroon by President Paul Biya of Cameroon and on behalf of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by then President Olusegun Obasanjo. The signing of the Agreement was witnessed by the United Nations; the Federal Republic of Germany; the United States of America; the French Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

By Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria recognises the sovereignty of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula in accordance with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10th October, 2002 in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. By virtue of Article 1 of the Agreement Nigeria unequivocally recognise the land and maritime boundary between the two countries as delineated by the International Court of Justice and commit herself to the process of the implementation of the Judgment which both countries had agreed.

It is instructive that the Green Tree Agreement is yet to be ratified by the National Assembly. Section 12 subsection of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered and amended) provides thus” No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly”. Undoubtedly the Green Tree Agreement to the extent that it was never presented before the National Assembly for ratification is unconstitutional.

Subsequently in a ceremony on the 21st August  2006 in the Calabar Sport Stadium, Calabar, Cross River State attended by dignitaries across the world the then President Olusegun Obasanjo formally handed over the sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. This included the formal withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from the Bakassi Peninsula.

It is therefore preposterous that after nearly ten years after the Judgment of the ICJ was delivered and six years after the sovereignty of Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was handed over some commentators would be advocating for an appeal to be filed by the Cross River State against the Judgment of the ICJ.

The pertinent question is Judgments of the ICJ appealable? In other words can judgment of the ICJ subject to an appeal?  The answer to the question is in the negative.

There basically six documents that guide the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICJ. These are United Nations Charter; the Statutes of the Court; Practice Directions and Rules of the Court and other texts.

It is submitted that Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides thus:

The judgment is final and without appeal. In the event of dispute as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall construe it upon the request of any party”.

It follows that there is no appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ. It goes without saying that either Nigeria or the Cross River State can appeal against the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002 in the in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is settled.

A cursorily reading of Article 60 of the Statute of the ICJ starkly reveals that ICJ is only vested with the jurisdiction to review its judgment in the event of a dispute as to its scope or meaning at the request of any of the Parties. The question is: Is there any dispute as to the scope or meaning of the Judgment in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria delivered on the 10th October, 2002 to warrant any of the Parties to invite the ICJ to review the said Judgment? The answer is Capital NO. There is no dispute whatever between Cameroon and Nigeria as to the scope and meaning of the Judgment. The Judgment has been unequivocally accepted by Nigeria by her signing of the Green Tree Agreement on the 12th June, 2002 in New York, the United States of America. Nigeria cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate. The equitable doctrine of estoppel shall operate against Nigeria in the event she makes any attempt to repudiate the Green Tree Agreement signed nearly six years ago. Generally when an estoppel binds a party to litigation, he is prevented from placing reliance on or denying the existence of certain facts. Therefore from the point of view of the party in whose favour it operates an estoppel could be regarded as something which renders proof of certain facts unnecessary.

Assuming without conceding that Nigeria did not sign the Green Tree Agreement; can she apply to the ICJ for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ delivered on the 10th October, 2002? 

Article 61 of the Statute of ICJ provides that an application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

I did not think that there is new fact discovered by Nigeria of such a decisive nature which was not known to Nigeria and the Court at the time of the delivery of the Judgment in October, 2002. In the event there is discovery of such a decisive fact it must be shown that it was not due negligence of the Party applying for a revision.



The General Provisions of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which the House of Representatives in its resolution had relied on to demand that the Federal Government initiate a process for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ was readily available at the time the judgment of the ICJ was delivered but was never commended to the Court by the Nigerian Legal Team. This in itself constitutes negligence which is not one of the factors that could avail a Party requesting a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ under Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. 

It is pertinent to reproduce Article 61, sub paragraphs 1, 2, 3 & 4 of the Statute of the ICJ for the purpose of clarity and understanding for the procedure for revision of the Judgment of the ICJ thus:

“Article 61

1. An application for revision of a judgment may be made only when it is based upon the discovery of some fact of such a nature as to be a decisive factor, which fact was, when the judgment was given, unknown to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, always provided that such ignorance was not due to negligence.

2. The proceedings for revision shall be opened by a judgment of the Court expressly recording the existence of the new fact, recognizing that it has such a character as to lay the case open to revision, and declaring the application admissible on this ground.

3. The Court may require previous compliance with the terms of the judgment before it admits proceedings in revision.

4. The application for revision must be made at latest within six months of the discovery of the new fact.

5. No application for revision may be made after the lapse of ten years from the date of the judgment”.

From the above, it is clear that it is the procedure for the revision of the Judgment of the ICJ as laid down by Article 61 of the Statutes of the ICJ which some commentators are confusing with appeal of the Judgment of the Judgment of the ICJ within ten years from the date of the Judgment.

It is pertinent to state that the ten years within which Nigeria may apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming the circumstance enumerated by the Statute of the ICJ) is applicable shall lapse on the 10th October, 2012.

It is clear as the crystal that Article 61 of the Statutes shall not avail Nigeria in the event she makes an application to the ICJ for the revision of the Nigeria delivered by the ICJ on the 10th October, 2002 in favour of Cameroon in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is certain that no Lawyer worth his salt will ever proffer such advice to Nigeria to gamble by making such a frivolous application to the ICJ.

Another question that is worthy of tackling is: whether the Cross River State can apply for a revision of the Judgment of the ICJ (assuming without conceding that Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ applies). The answer to the question is a Capital No.

The Cross River State was never a Party in the matter of the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria filed by Cameroon before the ICJ. The Parties to the case were Cameroon and Nigeria. It is well settled that the Cross River State is one of the 36 States that is composed of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It follows that the Cross River State cannot apply for the revocation of Article 61 of the Statute of the ICJ. The Cross River State is not recognised as a State Party by the Statute of the ICJ. Article 34 subparagraph 1 of the Statute of the ICJ explicitly provides that only states may be parties in cases before the Court.

The Cross River State is not a State within the concept of International Law. This proposition was given judicial approval by the High Court of the United Kingdom in the case DIEPREYE SOLOMON PETER ALAMIEYESEIGHA Vs. THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE [2005] EWHC . This was an application for Judicial Review filed by the former Governor of Bayelsa State, challenging the decision of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute him for money laundering. Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha brought an application that the decision to prosecute should be quashed on the grounds that he is entitled to sovereign immunity in his capacity as Governor and Chief Executive of Bayelsa State, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The question that was resolved was whether a Governor and Chief Executive of a state, which is a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is entitled to immunity in criminal proceedings brought in this country.

The Court resolved the question in the negative and held that  and held that since the Nigerian Constitution shows that the States such as Bayelsa State do not have any powers in respect of a number of matters which would normally be associated with a sovereign state such as, "arms. ammunitions and explosives", banking, "citizenship ,naturalisation and aliens", "defence", "immigration into and emigration from Nigeria", maritime matters, mines and minerals including oil fields and natural gas policing, post telegraph and telephone services, prisons, railways, "taxation of income, profits and capital gains except as otherwise prescribed by the [Nigerian] Constitution". These are all federal matters which are dealt with by the Federal Government to the exclusion of the Federal States (Part 1 of the Second Schedule of the Nigerian Constitution paragraphs items 2, 6,9,17,30,36,39, 45,46,48,55 and 59).

It is therefore clear that the claim by some people that the Judgment of the ICJ can be appealed against within 10 years by the Cross River State is hollow and not well founded.

OKOI OBONO-OBLA